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ABSTRACT 
The value of rational choice theory for the social sciences has been long debated. Such 
rational choice theory involves a theory of behaviour based on the assumption that individuals 
are acting, or acting as if, to maximise their utility. The critique developed here focuses on the 
universality and unfalsifiability of the rational choice approach. In principle it can be adapted 
to fit any form of behaviour, including the behaviour of non-human organisms. Rational 
choice theory has the character of a universal ‘explanation’ that can be made to ‘fit’ any set of 
events. This is a sign of weakness rather than strength. Powerful explanations in the social 
sciences must focus on the particularities of the human and modern condition. A theory that 
brings in those particularities as an afterthought will fail to capture their importance. It is 
shown that key concepts such as culture and learning fall into this category. The problem with 
rational choice theory is that, in its excessive quest for generality, it fails to focus on the 
historically and geographically specific features of the socio-economic systems. As long as 
social theory is confined to generalities, then it will remain highly limited in dealing with any 
specific world, including the one in which we live. 
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On the Limits of Rational Choice Theory 
by Geoffrey M. Hodgson1 
The question of the scope and validity of rational choice theory remains central to the 
discourse of modern social science. There is widespread agreement that, at least within some 
finite range of ‘bounded’ possibilities, some limited notion of rational choice may pertain 
(Simon, 1957). While problems then remain over the nature of ‘bounded’ rationality, the most 
important controversy concerns the much wider extension of rational choice theory to 
multiple domains, and its claims of explanation in this broader context. By rational choice 
theory in this context, we mean a theory of behaviour based on the assumption that 
individuals are acting (or acting as if) to maximise their utility. Increasingly recurrent claims 
have been made that this theoretical approach is capable of embracing key aspects of social as 
well as economic reality (Coleman, 1990; Coleman and Fararo, 1990). Indeed, approaches 
based on rational choice have escaped from their previous confinement within mainstream 
economics and are now making enormous inroads into sociology as well as political science. 
Against this trend, leading social theorists such as Amitai Etzioni (1988) have argued that 
rational choice theory omits unavoidable ethical dimensions of social or economic life. 
Amartya Sen (1976) has argued concordantly that the picture of the individual in exclusive 
pursuit of self-interested utilty denies the possibility of personal commitment to social or 
other values. Sen’s and Etzioni’s critiques are well-taken; they point to the limits of a purely 
utilitarian analysis of human behaviour that lies at the foundation of rational choice analysis. 
Further development of this type of critique involves a substantial excursion into 
philosophical territory, and discussion of the failure of utilitarianism to acknowledge ethical 
issues that are incapable of reduction to questions of individual satisfaction or utility. 
The critique presented here is of a different type, but it is complementary to some of the 
critiques that have focused on ethical and philosophical issues. The arguments here are not yet 
prominent in current debates, but they have precedents in the literature. Contrary to many of 
its supporters and critics, it is argued here that all claims of rational choice theory to ‘explain’ 
social or economic phenomena are strictly unfalsifiable, by any appeal to evidence. 
Accordingly, rational choice theory has the character of a universal ‘explanation’. In principle 
it could be made to ‘fit’ any set of events, including the behaviour or organisms in the non-
human world. 
However, it is argued that the outcome of the universality of the theory is a sign of 
weakness rather than strength. A theory that applies to non-human as well as human 
                                                 
1 The arguments in this paper were presented at the July 2000 meeting of the Society for the Advancement of 
Socio-Economics at the London School of Economics. Extensive use is made of material from Hodgson 
(2001). The author is especially grateful to Peter Abell, Mark Blaug and John Rogers Hollingsworth for 
discussions. 
 - 3 - 
phenomena is obliged to omit characteristics that are specifically human. For rational choice 
theory this is a huge and damning omission. 
As a result, rational choice theory fails to focus clearly on key human concepts such as 
culture and learning. While rational choice models have been developed that seem to 
encompass such phenomena, they fail to identify crucial aspects and become incapacitated by 
their over-generality. 
The rise of rational choice theory 
As the apparatus of rational choice theory has been both broadened and refined, its claims 
have expanded with increasing confidence, to the point where they lay claim to the territory 
not only of economics but to the entire social sciences and beyond. 
Earlier neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshall and Vilfredo Pareto, made it clear 
that economics was concerned with the more deliberative and calculative aspects of human 
behaviour. Marshall (1949, p. 17) wrote that ‘the side of life with which economics is 
specially concerned is that in which man’s conduct is most deliberate’. Pareto (1971) saw 
economics as being concerned with ‘logical’ actions, namely those where means are logically 
related to ends. Pareto (1935) also devoted himself to the quite separate science of sociology, 
claiming that this, in contrast, dealt with ‘non-logical’ action. From both the Marshallian and 
the Paretian points of view, economics was not an all-encompassing social science. It was 
concerned with particular kinds of activity or behaviour. 
Philip Wicksteed defined the domain of economics differently. He argued that the 
distinctive feature of ‘an economic transaction is that I am not considering you except as a 
link in the chain’ (Wicksteed, 1933, p. 174). In other words, economics was the study of 
relatively impersonal transactions. However, although the lines of demarcation were different, 
economics was still confined in its scope. A legitimate place was accorded to other social 
sciences. 
Lionel Robbins (1935, p. 16) began to change things radically with his new definition of 
economics as ‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses’. This forced sociologists such as Talcott Parsons 
onto a different tack. Sociology was to be the study of the formation of ends, economics of the 
means to attain given ends. A key difference in this new demarcation was that there was no 
longer a domain of social activity that was in principle free from the potential clutches of 
‘economics’ as Robbins had defined it. Robbins explicitly denied that economics was 
concerned with specific areas of enquiry, such as money, prices and markets. The boundary in 
the real world between the ‘economy’ and ‘society’ was no more. Henceforth, economics and 
sociology were both to concern themselves with the analysis of all human activity: the former 
with its means, the latter with its ends. 
It then became possible to separate completely the concept of utility from the idea of price 
or monetary value. Although money values could occasionally be used as surrogates for levels 
of utility (given the assumption of a constant marginal utility of money) this did not have to 
be so, especially in the field of pure theory. 
Shortly afterwards, Paul Samuelson (1938) and others insisted that economics could base 
itself on the claims of ‘revealed preference’ alone, and did not need to invoke any 
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psychological theory of human behaviour (Lewin, 1996).2 Sociology had broken with 
psychology, and mainstream economics rapidly followed suit. Like sociology under Parsons, 
mainstream economics then saw itself as independent of any psychological postulates. 
Demand theory was allegedly freed from both psychological theory and intersubjective 
interpretations of behaviour. The flirtation with revealed preference theory was crucial in this 
process. By focusing on measurable outcomes, it was believed that utility theory had had 
become ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’. 
Similarly, the assumption of deliberate or conscious choice was also regarded as inessential 
and unnecessarily restrictive, and removed from the theory (Machlup 1946; Friedman, 1953). 
As Ian Little (1949, p. 90) remarked, as a result of these developments, ‘a theory of 
consumers’ demand can be based solely on consistent behaviour’ rather than consumer 
propensities or plans. All that was required was that behaviour appeared to be consistent: in 
which case a fixed preference function could be imputed that would satisfy the standard 
axioms of utility theory. 
Once the core axioms of mainstream economics were reduced essentially to ‘consistent 
behaviour’ then the door was open to the removal, not only of psychology, but also of real 
economic and social institutions from the picture. By the 1960s this process was largely 
complete. Not only economics but also sociology was affected by this widespread thrust 
towards general or universalising theories.3 
The theory of ‘rational choice’ has been held up as the theoretical jewel in the neoclassical 
crown. It comes in various versions, but the central idea is that we may model individual 
behaviour in terms of a given preference function, in which agents maximise their ‘utility’. 
This function specifies the amounts of utility yielded from each combination of specific 
inputs. Each input enters as an argument in this function. These inputs can be standard 
consumer goods or services but can in principle include other items, such as the ‘human 
capital’ of the consumer, or the utility of others, or the available ‘social capital’ (Becker, 
1996). It is assumed that individuals make the ‘rational choice’ that maximises their utility 
according to the options available. The whole approach is to explain human behaviour simply 
on the basis of such preference functions, given limited resources and other constraints.4 
Note that this general approach does not even tell us whether the individual will behave in a 
selfish or altruistic way. In his modern guise, rational economic man is not necessarily a 
selfish hedonist. The possibility of a type of ‘altruism’ is admitted because the individual may 
have a preference function that ensures that extra utility is gained from the enhanced utility of 
                                                 
2 Although Samuelson’s ‘revealed preference’ theory is now widely regarded as a failure (Majumdar, 1958; Sen, 
1973; Wong, 1978), it nevertheless had a lasting effect, particularly by helping to break the surviving 
mainstream links between economics and psychology. 
3 Mouzelis (1995, p. 5) complains of the surfeit of ‘transhistorical, universalistic statements’ in sociology which 
do not take into account ‘history and context’ and ‘tend to be either wrong or trivial.’ One of his prime 
exemplars is rational choice theory. 
4 It should be pointed out that whether this theory does involve genuine choice is questionable. As Buchanan 
(1969) and several others argue, a choice is only meaningful if there is a possible alternative. We must have been 
able to ‘act otherwise’. The utility-maximisers of neoclassical economics are more like programmed automata 
than real choosers. 
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others (Collard, 1978). This means that the giving of a gift can mean a net gain in utility for 
the giver: the loss of utility resulting from the loss of the gift is compensated by a gain in 
utility resulting from our sensitivity to the increased utility of the recipient. In this way, 
‘altruism’ can be ostensibly ‘explained’. Rational choice theorists do not have to confine their 
models to agents who are simply maximising their own assets.5  
This relentless quest for universality gives rise to what is described by its practitioners as 
‘economic imperialism’. This refers to the invasion of other social sciences with the choice-
theoretic methods of neoclassical economics. It is argued that the core assumptions of 
neoclassical economics can and should be applied to a wide variety of fields of study, 
including politics, public administration, sociology, anthropology, psychology, history and 
even biology, as well as economics itself. It is based on the belief that the idea of ‘rational 
economic man’ is appropriate to behavioural science as a whole. The case for the conquest of 
other social sciences and biology by neoclassical economists rests on the presumed 
universality of such ideas as scarcity, competition and rational self-interest.6 
However, in their enthusiasm for economic imperialism, the advocates of the universal 
rational economic organism eventually settled on a definition of rationality that was 
unfalsifiable. The concept had become so elastic that any circumstance could fit it. This 
outcome is explored further below. 
Making predictions 
A widespread justification of utility theory is its alleged capacity to make predictions. Milton 
Friedman is a well-known exponent of this view. According to Friedman (1962, p. 13) 
‘economic theory proceeds largely to take wants as fixed’. The economist then makes 
predictions on the basis of this assumption. The legitimacy of this abstraction then allegedly 
rests on its ‘power to predict’. This is a positivist and instrumentalist criterion of theory 
justification, in terms of the capacity to make predictions. Countless models have been 
developed on the basis of the utility maximising or ‘rational’ choice. Some of these models 
generate falsifiable predictions. 
Consider the early attempts to apply utility-maximising, rational choice models to political 
phenomena. Some models in this vein predicted a zero turnout in democratic elections. The 
reasoning was as follows. With a sufficiently large number of voters, the costs of voting 
outweigh any positive marginal benefit to the voter, so there would be no net incentive to vote 
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). However, large numbers of people do vote voluntarily in 
elections. The prediction of the model is manifestly false. 
                                                 
5 However, the altruistic agent is still maximising his or her own utility. On the contrary, true altruism would 
occur if we gave to others and made ourselves worse off, even in net utility terms. This criticism shows that 
utility theory still depends upon a specific, self-centred notion of the individual and is not so universal as its 
advocates make claim. Nevertheless, this does not make the theory adequate for the analysis of a society of 
greedy or self-centred individuals, because the institutional and cultural bases of such a system are inadequately 
explored. 
6 Prominent extensions to biology include Becker (1976) and Hirshleifer (1977, 1985). On ‘economic 
imperialism’ see also Radnitzky (1992), Radnitzky and Bernholz (1987) and the critiques in Nicolaides (1988) 
and Udéhn (1992). 
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However, although the particular model is severely questioned, this evidence does not in 
any way refute utility maximisation or rational choice theory. It refutes one model only, 
which is based on specific and narrower additional assumptions. Subsequently, political 
theorists have had little difficulty constructing different rational choice models that generated 
predictions that got closer to voting turnouts in the real world. For instance, it could be 
assumed that people are getting a substantial amount of utility simply from placing their vote. 
Tune the utility function appropriately, and we get a closer approximation to the empirical 
data on real world behaviour. 
The point being made here is not that rational choice or utility theory is either refuted or 
confirmed by the evidence. The point is that utility theory can be used to make falsifiable 
predictions, but only when specific auxiliary assumptions are made. As Mark Blaug (1992, p. 
232) observed: ‘The rationality hypothesis by itself is rather weak. To make it yield 
interesting implications, we need to add auxiliary assumptions’. These add-on assumptions 
may concern the shape and arguments of the utility functions, the nature of the constraints, the 
existence of uniformities between agents, and so on. It is these additional assumptions that do 
the predictive work, not the assumptions of rationality or utility-maximisation per se (Shaper, 
2000). By this argument, utility theory is not necessarily wrong. But it is manifestly 
inadequate. Utility theorists demonstrate these inadequacies themselves when they always 
have to bring in additional assumptions to make any meaningful empirical prediction. 
The non-falsifiability of the theory 
Perhaps a fundamental ‘predictive’ claim of utility theory is that the substitution effect is 
negative. The detailed argument can be found in the neoclassical textbooks. This shows that if 
a price increase occurs, and compensation is made for any change of ‘real’ (i.e. utility) 
income, then the demand for the good or service will decrease. Conversely, a price decrease 
will lead to a demand increase, under similar compensatory conditions. The proof of the 
negativity of the substitution effect follows directly from the assumptions of the theory 
(Hicks, 1939). 
Can the negative sign of the substitution effect be used to predict human behaviour? Is it a 
falsifiable prediction? Regrettably, the answer to both questions is no. Any observed 
behaviour can be fitted into the theory. If the price increases and demand also goes up, then 
that does not contradict the theory. In this case it could simply be said that the ‘real’ income 
(measured in terms of utility rather than prices) is not constant. If we were to make an 
adequate income compensation, and assume a sufficiently lower ‘real’ income before the 
price change, then the apparent anomaly would disappear. We are free to make a wide range 
of assumptions concerning the imagined compensation. The compensation has to be such to 
place the individual at exactly the same utility level, before and after the price change. But we 
do not know this utility level, or the shape of the indifference curve! 
The compensation is thus a thought experiment, rather than an investigation into processes 
in the real world. Reality can be no adjudicator in this thought experiment, because we cannot 
directly measure utility. This high degree of compensatory discretion makes the theory 
untestable in terms of its behavioural predictions. The result may have the aesthetic appeal 
and the apparent universality of a mathematical theorem, but it does not enable us to make 
any prediction that can be falsified by any possible outcome in the real world. 
Experimental psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky 
(1982) have thrown down experimental challenges to expected utility theory. More broadly, 
since the 1980s there has been a spectacular growth in interest in ‘experimental economics’. 
Many people have interpreted the behavioural evidence gathered by the experimenters as a 
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violation of the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Much of this evidence, particularly 
concerning choices under risk, has led some mainstream theorists to reflect critically upon the 
standard assumptions of their theory. Evidence is important and it should be taken seriously.7 
However, if we were to think that the evidence itself refutes or falsifies the core axioms of 
utility theory, then we would be mistaken. The reason being that the standard core of utility 
theory is non-falsifiable. As Sidney Winter (1964, pp. 309, 315) argued in an early and 
neglected article: ‘any behavior can in one way or another be rationalized as maximizing 
behavior’. 
Lawrence Boland (1981) expanded on this in another important paper. With the provocative 
title ‘the futility of criticizing the neoclassical maximization hypothesis’, his essay was first 
widely misinterpreted as a defence of a theory that the mainstream economists had already 
accepted and taken for granted. Consequently, Boland’s paper is now largely forgotten.8 
In fact, it is better understood as a critique of the maximisation hypothesis. In his paper, 
Boland asked if any conceivable evidence would refute the maximising assumption. He then 
showed that such an attempt at falsification could never work: 
Given the premise – ‘All consumers maximize something’ – the critic can claim he has 
found a consumer who is not maximizing anything. The person who assumed the premise 
is true can respond: ‘You claim you have found a consumer who is not a maximizer but 
how do you know there is not something which he is maximizing?’ (Boland, 1981, p. 
1034) 
Given that we can never in principle demonstrate that ‘something else’ (perhaps unknown to 
us) is not being maximised, then the theory is ultimately invulnerable to any empirical attack. 
To show empirically that nothing is being maximised we would have to measure every 
possible variable that could impinge upon humanity, from the weather to the twinkling of the 
stars. Clearly, this would be an endless and impossible task. As Boland (ibid.) concluded: 
The neoclassical assumption of universal maximization could very well be false, but as a 
matter of logic we cannot expect to be able to prove that it is. 
Boland showed that the neoclassical assumption is not falsifiable. But he also rightly points 
out that it is not a tautology. It is not a tautology because it is conceivably false. It might be 
the case that nothing is being maximised. But we can never know.9 
                                                 
7 For summaries of the issues and debates in experimental economics see Kagel and Roth (1995). The debate is 
taken further by Binmore (1999), Loomes (1998, 1999) and Starmer (1999a, 1999b). 
8 See Boland’s (1996) own later reflections on the misinterpretation of his argument. 
9 Given that the theory is unfalsifiable, Boland (1981) goes on to examine its ‘metaphysical’ status. Here Boland 
can be misunderstood, unless his strong Popperian inclinations are acknowledged. He alleges that it is ‘futile’ to 
criticise the theory because it is ‘non-falsifiable’ and thereby ‘metaphysical’. By the famous Popperian criterion, 
this also means that it is ‘non-scientific’. This is the understated and impish outcome to Boland’s argument. 
Where Boland is vulnerable is not in the demonstration of unfalsifiability but in his excessive faith in the 
Popperian criterion. From this viewpoint, non-falsifiable statements are ‘metaphysical’ and invulnerable: trying 
to refute them is a waste of time. Hence, for Boland, ‘criticism’ can usefully be directed at falsifiable statements 
only – and the main means of ‘criticism’ is empirical falsification. In response, Caldwell (1983) shows that 
Boland’s demonstration of ‘the futility’ of criticising the hypothesis rests upon an overly narrow notion of 
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The arguments of Winter and Boland have been much neglected. They do not rule out the 
role of evidence in evaluating the theory, but they show that the evidence alone cannot be 
decisive. Boland also warns us that utility maximisation is not ‘tautological’. Strangely, some 
critics regard the allegation of ‘tautology’ as a damning weakness. On the contrary, a 
tautological theory, whether it is ‘empty’ or not, must be accepted as valid. By saying that 
utility maximisation is not a tautology we are admitting the possibility that it is false, although 
no single piece of evidence can show that it is untrue. 
In some respects, Boland’s argument resembles the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis.10 This 
thesis derives from the work of the French physicist Pierre Duhem and the American 
philosopher Willard van Orman Quine (Harding, 1976). According to the thesis that is given 
their joint name, it is not possible to falsify a single hypothesis because we are always faced 
with a tangle of related and connected hypotheses. Consequently, we can never be sure that 
the main hypothesis is being targeted and tested on its own, and that other auxiliary 
hypotheses are not complicating the picture. Boland, Duhem and Quine all point to the 
multiplicity and interconnectedness of possible causal influences behind any empirical 
phenomenon in the real world, and the general difficulty of isolating and testing them all. 
Just as we cannot isolate every connected and auxiliary hypothesis, we cannot consider all 
the possible hypothetical variables that could be maximised. As a result it can be argued that 
there is no experimental or other phenomenon that cannot in principle be ‘explained’ by the 
theory. Nothing lies outside its scope. Even the so-called anomalies revealed by experiments 
with human subjects can be explained away. If experiments show that some consumers appear 
to prefer a monetary reward that is less than the expected outcome, or appear to have 
intransitive preference orderings, then we can always get round these problems by introducing 
other variables.11 
For instance, if an experiment shows that option A with an expected value of $4 is preferred 
to option B with an expected value of $5 then we can simply assume that there are additional 
attributes of option A (for example, we may enjoy losing, or gain pleasure from seeing others 
win) that are consistent with the view that it yields higher overall utility for the subject. 
Likewise, an experiment may seem to reveal preference intransitivity, by showing that while 
X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, Z is preferred to X. Even this result can be 
explained away by showing that the three pairwise comparisons did not take place under 
identical conditions, or were separated in time or space. Accordingly, the consumer could 
have ‘learned’ more about his or her true tastes during the experiment itself, or other factors 
may account for the apparent intransitivity. All we have to do is indicate in some way that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘criticism’. Caldwell argues convincingly that it is also possible to criticise particular non-falsifiable statements, 
for instance by looking at their underlying assumptions. Caldwell thus points to a wider and deeper discussion of 
the role and viability of core assumptions. In practice, the falsification criterion is not only too narrow but also 
potentially far too destructive for any theory. Strictly applied, just one apparently conflicting observation would 
serve to destroy the theory in question. Caldwell is right to suggest that the appraisal of theories must deploy a 
number of additional criteria, and not pin everything on falsification. Nevertheless, Boland’s central result – that 
no imaginable evidence can in principle falsify the theory – still stands. 
10 Some of the implications of this thesis for macroeconomics are discussed by Cross (1982). Cross usefully 
reviews some of the attacks on the Duhem-Quine thesis and concludes that it has ‘withstood criticism’ (p. 322). 
11 Hausman (1992, ch. 13) documents several attempts to explain the apparent anomalies that have been revealed 
by the experimenters, notably by pointing to other possible sources of utility. 
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two Zs in the above comparisons are not quite identical. The two Zs could be slightly different 
in timing, substance, or their informational or other contexts. We then get the result: X is 
preferred to Y, Y is preferred to Z1, and Z2 is preferred to X. Transitivity is no longer violated. 
It is also claimed that preference reversals are inconsistent with expected utility theory. 
‘Preference reversals occur when individuals are presented with two gambles, one featuring a 
high probability of winning a modest sum of money … the other featuring a low probability 
of winning a large sum of money’ (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983, p. 596). Assume that a 
subject is faced with a choice between $10 with certainty, and $1,000 with a probability of 2 
per cent. Experiments with real subjects indicate that in such situations the first, $10 option is 
sometimes chosen (Kahneman et al, 1982; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). This is despite the 
fact that the expected value of the second option is higher at $20. However, preference 
reversals also fail to falsify expected utility theory, once we accept that utility is not 
necessarily measured in terms of the monetary payoffs in the experiment. If we assume a 
sufficiently declining marginal utility of money, or an added disutility associated with 
involvement in a risky and low probability choice, then expected utility theory is not 
overturned. In general, a risk averse actor will not maximise expected monetary value but still 
be maximising expected utility. By appropriate functional manipulation, the choice of $10 can 
be made perfectly consistent with the maximisation of expected utility, rather than the 
maximisation of the expected monetary value of the payoff. 
Experimental economists such as Vernon Smith (1982) and others have addressed the 
problem of the possible absence of a linear correlation between utility and monetary payoff. 
In particular, the possibility of additional, subjective utilities - unrelated to the monetary 
payoffs - has to be diminished. The money payoffs have to ‘dominate’ the decisions of the 
agents. To make experiments ‘work’ in the sense of a close presumed correlation between 
overall utility and monetary payoff, Smith proposes a number of ‘precepts’ of experimental 
assumption and design constituting an ‘induced value procedure’. These precepts include 
nonsatiation, sufficiently large and obvious rewards, restriction of communication between 
subjects, and so on. But Smith (p. 929) himself is the first to admit that these precepts cannot 
guarantee any correspondence between observable monetary rewards and preferences that, in 
principle, are ‘not directly observable’. In short, we can never know if the precept has been 
effectively applied. Accordingly, the most judicious application of Smith’s precepts will not 
banish the problem of non-falsifiability. There is no way of showing that a close correlation 
between utility and experimental reward has been achieved. The idea that Smith’s precepts 
‘work’ is a classic article of faith, placed so far under surprisingly little methodological 
scrutiny.12 
The limits of universality 
Accordingly, a problem with the standard rationality assumptions is not that they lack 
empirical correlation, but that they could cover every conceivable decision situation and every 
possible causal mechanism underlying choice. Insofar as there may be common features of 
every decision situation then it may be possible to extract universal and meaningful 
propositions. Nevertheless, some important and specific features or causal mechanisms may 
be excluded by concentrating solely on the common features of every decision situation. In 
fact, the degree of universality involved is so great that it goes beyond the parameters of mere 
human decision. 
                                                 
12 For a critical methodological discussion of Smith’s precepts see Siakantaris (2000). 
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Recent theoretical and experimental studies confirm this high degree of universality, 
beyond the confines of human society. Experimental work with rats and other animals (Kagel 
et al, 1981, 1995) has ‘revealed’ that animals have downward-sloping demand curves, 
supposedly just like humans. Gary Becker (1991, p. 307) has argued extensively that: 
‘Economic analysis is a powerful tool not only in understanding human behavior but also in 
understanding the behavior of other species.’ Similarly, Gordon Tullock (1994) has claimed 
that organisms – from bacteria to bears – can be treated as if they have the same general type 
of preference function that is attributed to humans in the microeconomics textbooks. They are 
all regarded as utility-maximisers. Accordingly, core concepts are not only applied to all 
forms of human society since the origin of our species, but also to a large portion of the 
animal kingdom as well. Seemingly, we now have ‘evidence’ of the ‘rationality’ of everything 
in evolution from the amoeba onwards. This suggests that such assumptions are telling us 
very little about specifically human societies, least of all about the unique complexities of 
modern human civilisation. 
For the neoclassical economist, the fact that utility theory can ‘explain’ a wide variety of 
types of economic behaviour is regarded as a strong vindication of this general approach. I 
take a different view. First, the sheer generality of a theory tells us nothing of its explanatory 
power. We could conceive different general theories, such as that we all are programmed by 
aliens from outer space, or that we are all pawns of God. These would be quite general in their 
scope and could be applied in principle to any behavioural manifestation. But we would 
rightly be sceptical of their explanatory value. A theory does not explain anything unless it 
points to an underlying causal mechanism. In the case of individual behaviour, explanations 
must thus relate to the known mechanisms of the human psyche and human interaction and 
draw upon psychology, anthropology, sociology and other disciplines. This is precisely what 
the neoclassical advocates of utility theory refuse to do. They take the utility functions as 
given and give the job of grounding them theoretically to somebody else. By this refusal they 
indicate that utility theory itself cannot provide a real explanation. 
Arguably, human societies are partly differentiated from other animals in terms of 
developed institutions and cultures. If utility maximising behaviour not confined to humanity, 
then these differentiating elements are effectively absent from the universal picture. Whether 
true or false, this picture can tell us little of importance about historically specific human 
cultures or institutions. That is the unintended achievement of the exponents of ubiquitous 
rationality and economic imperialism. The causal mechanisms through which culture and 
institutions mould and constrain human agents remain unexplored in this paradigm. 
Essentially, there is no adequate and substantial theory of human agency at the core of the 
standard theory. It tells us nothing of significance that is specifically about the human psyche 
or about human interaction. Outside the realm of the universal, no particular causal 
mechanism is identified by the theory. With respect to specifically human characteristics and 
specific human societies, it is causally vacuous. Its very weakness stems from its excessive 
universality. Indeed, to attain the status of universality it has to be evacuated of much of its 
real content. 
This conclusion is consistent with Ernst Nagel’s (1961, p. 575) ‘principle of the inverse 
variation of extension with intension’. Although Nagel attempted to give further reasons for 
favouring general theories, his argument also suggested that universality is gained at the cost 
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of an ability to discriminate between and explain concrete particulars. This argument has 
some force against the claimed universality of neoclassical economics.13 
Weak criticism and false approval 
However, many critics of mainstream economics have taken a different line of attack. In a 
classic critique, Terence Hutchison (1938, p. 27) argued that the basic postulates of ‘pure 
theory’ necessarily suffered from a ‘complete lack of empirical content’. Many similar 
remarks have been made by heterodox economists, before and since. For example, the Post 
Keynesian economist Alfred Eichner (1983, p. 211), complained that the core assumptions of 
mainstream economic theory ‘have yet to be empirically validated’ and that they have ‘no 
empirical counterpart in the observable world’. However, the problem with these assumptions 
is not primarily their lack of empirical corroboration. It is that they are vessels into which any 
empirical content can be filled. The problem with the theory is not that it lacks empirical 
validation but that any conceivable fact about behaviour, from church attendance to suicide, 
can be fitted into the theory.14 
Just as the critics of neoclassical theory wrongly claim that its basic postulates have been 
falsified, its exponents misleadingly claim that they have been rigorously confirmed. Jack 
Hirshleifer (1985, p. 59) went so far as to write: ‘Ultimately we must be ready to abandon the 
rationality paradigm to the extent that it fails to fit the evidence about human behavior.’ 
However, this apparent concession to empirical confirmation in fact conceals a 
methodological misunderstanding. Hirshleifer did not have to worry, because no conceivable 
evidence can ‘fail to fit’ some tortured version of the theory. Both Hirshleifer and the critics 
of the rationality paradigm share the flawed supposition: that evidence can in principle refute 
the theory. Both supporters and critics of neoclassical theory have perpetuated the myth that it 
is susceptible to decisive empirical testing. 
As a result, the mainstream theory is not wrong because it is empirically inaccurate. It is not 
unrealistic in the sense that it fails to fit the data. Any data can be fitted into it. Hence no data 
can refute the theory. It cannot be displaced simply by an appeal to the evidence. The 
experimental evidence of preference reversals and other choice ‘anomalies’ may lead us to 
search for a different and better theory, but it does not in principle refute the old version based 
on utility and rational choice.15 
Critics such as Hutchison (1938) and Eichner (1983) based their criticism on an untenable 
and empiricist view of science that denies that some non-falsifiable and ‘metaphysical’ 
assumptions are essential to any science. In fact, all sciences depend upon some propositions 
that are untestable. No theory can be composed entirely of empirically validated elements. 
Prior concepts are required to make sense of any fact. These prior concepts cannot all be 
                                                 
13 See Udéhn (1992). However, while I concur with much of Udéhn’s argument, he credits neoclassical 
economics with some relative success in explaining market, as opposed to non-market, phenomena. While the 
genuine achievements of neoclassical economics should not be denied, it concedes too much to suggest that it 
has an adequate definition and analysis of market institutions. 
14 This is no joke. See Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) and Hammermesh and Soss (1974). 
15 I am not arguing that evidence is unimportant. Although evidence cannot falsify the theory, the accumulated 
evidence may provide a context in which the theory is more readily questioned. See Loomes (1998, pp. 485-6). 
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‘tested’ empirically. In any case, any ‘test’ itself relies on prior concepts or categories. As a 
result, all sciences must unavoidably make extensive use of some untestable and metaphysical 
assumptions. 
Immanuel Kant (1929, p. 7) revealed in 1781 that human reason ‘begins with principles 
which it has no option save to employ’ but which ‘are no longer subject to any empirical test’. 
Accordingly, he recognised a role for metaphysics. Subsequently, in the heyday of positivism, 
the idea that metaphysics had any place in science was challenged. But from the 1950s, 
positivism itself was subjected to strong philosophical attacks. In particular, Willard van 
Orman Quine (1951) successfully overturned the view that all scientific and meaningful 
statements had to be based upon empirical experience. Eventually, Karl Popper also 
recognised that some metaphysical propositions are essential to science (Ackerman, 1976, pp. 
30-1). The indispensable role of untestable and metaphysical assumptions is now widely 
accepted by philosophers.16 
For this reason, the Hutchison-Eichner empiricist criticism of mainstream economics is 
untenable. In practice, furthermore, their denial of the essential role of non-falsifiable 
assumptions in any theory would disable any of their own attempts at theoretical construction. 
Given that it is practically impossible to test all assumptions, any theoretical construction 
would reveal hidden, ‘ad hoc’ assumptions, privileged to lie beyond empirical test. For 
reasons outlined above, every theory must involve some untestable assumptions. Hence any 
theory built on the claim of complete testability would be highly vulnerable to critique by its 
own canon. 
However, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’ and that all criticisms are disabled. There 
are powerful theoretical criticisms of the rationality assumption. Essentially, the theory lacks 
adequate theoretical concepts to discriminate, understand and properly explain key 
phenomena. A problem with the standard assumptions of rationality and expected utility 
maximisation is their lack of specific theoretical and conceptual content, pertaining to specific 
causal mechanisms involved in the human psyche and in the structures of specific real world 
economic institutions. 
To repeat: the empirical evidence is valuable and important, but it cannot be used to show 
that the theory is false. In recent years, there have been attempts to apply models of rational, 
utility maximising behaviour to a wide variety of phenomena, even beyond the sphere of 
commerce and markets. Models of utility-maximising behaviour have been applied to politics, 
marriage, religion, suicide, and much else. Such attempts have been widely resisted. Many 
tried to defend their academic discipline or subdiscipline from the ‘economic imperialism’ of 
rational choice models. However, the widespread failure to recognise the non-falsifiability of 
‘rational’ maximising behaviour has weakened many such counter-arguments. They appealed 
to evidence: it was mistakenly argued that rational choice models did not fit the facts. On the 
contrary, models of utility-maximising behaviour can always be adjusted to fit the facts. The 
attempt to resist the incursions of rational choice theory by claiming otherwise was bound to 
fail. In this instance, appeals to evidence cannot win. 
In development economics, for example, there was a debate in the 1970s over whether 
peasants were or were not ‘rational’. Critics of this idea appealed to ‘evidence’ of ‘non-
rational’ behaviour, without realising that no evidence can strictly falsify the theory. With 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Caldwell’s (1982) critical discussion of positivism and Blaug’s (1992) account of the role of 
Lakatosian ‘hard core’ assumptions. 
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opponents weakened by their own theoretical position and methodological misunderstandings, 
the rational choice theorists seemed to win the argument (Popkin, 1979). Similarly weak 
defences were evident in sociology and political science, as they too were invaded by rational 
choice theorists. Again and again an attempt was made to resist the incursions of utility and 
rational choice, on the grounds that its assumptions are not ‘realistic’. Such attempted 
defences against the invasion of rational choice theory are methodologically flawed and 
ultimately doomed. 
The moral here is that mistaken claims concerning the testability of rational choice theory 
led its opponents to attack it with weak arguments. It would have been much more fruitful if 
both sides had admitted that the theory was falsifiable and then debated its explanatory value 
in specific circumstances. Instead, these controversies were entirely confined to claims and 
counter claims concerning empirical validation. At that primitive level the issue is simple: the 
assumptions of utility theory cannot be falsified. 
The deconstruction of rationality 
However, having almost conquered the social sciences, some of the rational choice theorists 
have become bored with their own weapons of victory. Ironically, it is beginning to be 
possible, even fashionable, for mainstream economists to question some of these core 
assumptions. Perhaps because mainstream economists have lost the capacity to police their 
own disciplinary boundaries, in search of a new separate identity they have begun to question 
their own raison d’être. As Kyriakos Kontopoulos (1993, p. 90) has pointed out: ‘Ironically, 
economists become less economistic at a time when sociologists seem to become enamored 
with rational choice theory.’ Accordingly, some economists are now deconstructing rational 
economic man. As economist Robert Sugden (1991, p. 783) put it: 
There was a time, not long ago, when the foundations of rational-choice theory appeared 
firm, and when the job of the economic theorist seemed to be one of drawing out the often 
complex implications of a fairly simple and uncontroversial system of axioms. But it is 
increasingly becoming clear that these foundations are less secure than we thought, and 
that they need to be examined and perhaps rebuilt. 
One reason for this change of heart is the rise of game theory. In certain types of game the 
very definition of rationality becomes problematic. Nevertheless, the response of mainstream 
economists to these problems has largely to become immersed in the technicalities, rather 
than to give the economic agents at the core of the theory of human behaviour some real 
institutional and cultural flesh and blood. Some still cling tenaciously to the principles of 
rationality, in a manner that is reminiscent of Ptolemaic astronomers, fitting the evidence of 
the apparent circular movements of the stars into complicated models (Koestler, 1959). Others 
are not inclined simply to ‘save appearances’; they express their misgivings but seem unaware 
where to look to find an alternative paradigm. 
For some, the move to game theory has led to the questioning of core assumptions. For 
others it has reinforced the idea that economics itself is a formal game, with little connection 
to reality. If a theory makes no claim outside a single domain, then there is no aim to use the 
theory to explain other real world phenomena. The interest in the theory is typically in its 
mathematical content, rather than its usefulness to help understand reality. Accordingly, there 
is a move away from former attempts to build a universal theory (which turned out to be 
unfalsifiable), to the building of exemplifying theories that are not designed to be put under 
any empirical scrutiny whatsoever. There is a move from universal to ‘what if?’ theories. Step 
by step, mainstream economics is becoming disengaged with the real world. Instead of 
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looking at real institutional structures and mechanisms, it has become more and more 
involved in the niceties of mathematical technique. 
Conclusion: the new frontier 
Becker (1966) and others have attempted to show that factors such as ‘culture’ can be brought 
into rational choice theory by adding many arguments to the utility function. Among these 
arguments are cultural variables, so that the individual may seem to change his or her choices 
as a result of cultural shifts. The thrust of this type of analysis to show that a more 
sophisticated utility function can fit behaviour where individuals react to cultural 
circumstances. 
Again, the problem with this analysis is not that it fails to fit the evidence. The problem is 
that it is untenable on theoretical grounds. Becker’s approach seems to presume that each 
individual is born with a preference function that is already primed to deal with cultural 
circumstances of which the infant is ostensibly unaware. According to Becker, an individual’s 
preference function is already primed to deal with all sorts of foreign foods and ways, so that 
if we so happened to immerse ourselves in a foreign culture we would learn to like such 
things as sushi or sauerkraut. How could this be? Although we can imagine in the world of 
theory such a universal, culturally-sensitive utility function, the idea that it exists in our minds 
is implausible. 
If, on the other hand, it is argued that this analytical approach does not assume that 
individuals really have such an utility function, but that it involves the assumption that people 
act as if they had one. The response to this argument is that, given the non-falsifibility of the 
rational choice approach, it is no big deal to show that people act as if they are maximising 
utility. Any behaviour can in principle be made consistent with a utility function. Where 
claims of specific predictions are involved, they are achieved by adding auxiliary, restrictive 
assumptions to the utility model (Shaper, 2000). 
Take another important and related example. Learning is treated inadequately in the 
neoclassical economics (Hodgson, 1999). Basing itself on the idea of ‘rational economic 
man’, neoclassical economics has thereby to assume that the individual is capable of 
appraising all the known choice possibilities. Furthermore, each choice is assessed on the 
basis of a fixed ‘preference function’ which is mysteriously bestowed upon the individual at 
the beginning of its (adult?) life. Typically, neoclassical economics treats learning as the 
cumulative discovery of pre-existing ‘blueprint’ information, as stimulus and response, or as 
the Bayesian updating of subjective probability estimates in the light of incoming data. With 
the ‘input’ of this new information we are supposed, on the basis of our unchanging 
preference function, to determine mechanically our choices. 
Again, we can ‘model’ learning by assuming complicated utility functions with many 
arguments. In the work of Becker (1996), the function is already ‘there’, ready to deal with 
unpredictable and unknowable circumstances. For instance, it already ‘knows’ how to react to 
the technology and inventions of the next century. Miraculously, its parameter space already 
includes variables representing the ideas and commodities of the future. Mysteriously, it has 
already learned how to recognise them. The question is posed as to what is meant by learning 
in such circumstances when we already know essentially what is to be learned? Such a 
conception of learning must be sorely inadequate. 
In reality, instead of the mere input of ‘facts’, learning is a developmental and 
reconstitutive process. Learning is much more than a process of blueprint discovery, stimulus-
response, input enhancement or statistical correction. Learning is a process of problem-
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formulation and problem-solving, rather than the acquisition and accumulation of given ‘bits’ 
of information ‘out there’. Learning is not the cumulative addition of knowledge upon a 
tabula rasa: it entails getting rid of old ideas as well as acquiring new ones. Developing the 
capacity to unlearn, and learn anew, is itself a part of the learning process. This process 
involves conjecture and error, in which mistakes become opportunities to learn rather than 
mere random perturbations. Neoclassical economics has fundamental problems with learning 
because the very notion of ‘rational learning’ is problematic. Learning involves adaptation to 
changing circumstances, in contrast to the neoclassical emphasis on equilibrium. 
But note that the above is a theoretical criticism, rather than one based on falsification by 
evidence. The examples of culture and learning do not show that these phenomena cannot be 
fitted into some rational choice model. In principle, this can be done. The real question is: 
what is achieved and explained by such an approach? Furthermore, how does this approach 
explain the origin and development of the capacities that are encapsulated in the presumed 
utility function? If we are to take human evolution seriously, then it is implausible to suggest 
that humans can be understood in terms of utility functions that have arguments relating to 
future items or events (Hodgson, 1998). 
It has been argued elsewhere (Hodgson, 2001; Potts, 2000) that adequate social and 
economic theory involves a focus on specificities as well as generalities. The trouble about 
general theories, even if they are valid, is that they cannot tell us very much about special 
cases or particular circumstances. At best, a general theory can account for variation in terms 
of different parameter values. It cannot readily accommodate the unique structural features of 
any particular phenomenon. 
This is the problem with rational choice theory. It is over-general to the point of 
unfalsifiability. In response, it is a weak strategy of criticism to attempt to find instances 
where rational choice does not work. In principle a model can always be found to fit the 
phenomena. Accordingly, it is also a weak strategy of defence to attempt to show that a 
specific phenomenon fits into a rational choice mode. In principle this always can be done. 
The debate has to go beyond the weak arguments on both sides. 
It can be freely admitted that, in a limited sense, people do make deliberate and ‘rational’ 
choices. If we notice two similar items of a different cost, then we may be rationally inclined 
to purchase the cheaper one. Such a rational calculus applies more readily to a world where 
information concerning quality and price are available and transparent, and cost-minimisation 
dominates our concerns. As Max Weber (1975) argued in 1908, rationality finds its fullest 
development in the pecuniary culture of modern capitalism. But this does not mean that the 
concept of rationality is adequate to describe all behaviour in the modern world. 
Rational choice theory has invaded social sciences such as sociology with its devotees 
declaring triumphantly that it can ‘explain’ nuanced social phenomena such as altruism, 
honour, trust and duty. The point argued here is that it is ineffective to counter these 
allegations with denials of their empirical validity. This is a weak response because, in 
principle, any manifest behaviour can be fitted into the rational choice framework. However, 
once the unfalsifiable nature of rational choice theory is understood, we can meet the 
triumphant claims with the polite response: ‘So what. We know in advance that any behaviour 
can fit the theory.’ We are then able to move on to the more important question, concerning 
claims of explanation and their derivation. Explanation, we insist, is much more than 
empirical correlation. And a perfect empirical fit does not necessarily imply any explanation 
of the causal processes underlying behaviour. The debate then moves on to the vital question 
as to how such causal explanations can be obtained. 
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It is my personal view that economic and social theory can only advance if it takes account 
of historical, cultural and institutional specificities. The crusade for rational choice theory in 
modern social science is part of a wider project to develop a universal theory of all social 
phenomena. The problem with such a theory is that, in its excessive quest for generality, it 
will fail to focus on the historically and geographically specific features of the socio-
economic systems that we wish to study and understand. As long as social theory is confined 
to generalities it will remain highly limited in dealing with any specific socio-economic 
system, including the one in which we live. What is required is a theory that is far more 
sensitive in this regard. 
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